The unbiased forward rate hypothesis before and after the inflation targeting regime in South Africa: A cointegration Analysis by Mavee, Nasha & Bonga-Bonga, Lumengo
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The unbiased forward rate hypothesis
before and after the inflation targeting
regime in South Africa: A cointegration
Analysis
Nasha Mavee and Lumengo Bonga-Bonga
University of Johannesburg
8 January 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/77195/
MPRA Paper No. 77195, posted 1 March 2017 07:50 UTC
The Unbiased Forward Rate Hypothesis Before and After the Inflation Targeting 
Regime in South Africa: A Cointegration Analysis 
by 
Nasha Mavee, University of Johannesburg, South Africa 
Lumengo Bonga-Bonga, University of Johannesburg, South Africa 
  
Abstract  
This paper investigates the relationship between the future spot and forward rates in the South 
African foreign exchange market to infer whether the unbiased forward rate hypothesis (UFRH) 
holds in South Africa. More specifically we examine whether the hypothesis holds in the face of 
the different monetary policy regimes taken by the South African reserve bank. We distinguish 
between two periods; (1) the period before inflation targeting and (2) the period after inflation 
targeting from February 2000 to the present. The study applies the autoregressive dynamic lag 
(ARDL) cointegration technique to test the existence of the long-run relationship between the 
two variables. The results of this investigation indicate that existence of a long-run relationship 
between the two variables for all forward rates horizons, especially for the period after inflation 
targeting. This indicates that an improvement of market efficiency in South Africa during the 
inflation targeting period.  
Keywords:  UFRH, cointegration, monetary policy 
JEL classification: C5, G15 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
During the early 1960s, Eugene Fama introduced the concept of efficient markets; where he 
argued that asset prices fully reflected all relevant and available information (Fama, 1991) by 
adjusting rapidly to the arrival of new information. In essence the efficient market hypothesis 
implies that the market processes information rationally in the sense that all relevant information 
is not ignored and systematic errors are not made (Beechey et al, 2000).  
 
The extent to which exchange rate markets can be characterised as approximately efficient 
market remains an interesting question that can best be answered through formal econometric 
analysis (Wesso, 1999). One popular hypothesis of foreign exchange market efficiency is the 
unbiased forward rate hypothesis. In the “simple efficiency” specification of forward exchange 
markets, it is often argued that the forward rate “fully reflects” available information about the 
future spot exchange rate expectations; consequently, the forward rate is typically viewed as an 
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unbiased predictor of the future spot rate. The expectations theory posits that the economic 
agents are able to process information rapidly. Through the arbitrage activities of the economic 
agents and market adjustments, the forward rates reflect the information that is expected to 
determine future spot rates (Wesso, 1999). 
 
Foreign exchange market efficiency therefore contends that economic agents fully incorporate all 
available information efficiently in their forecasts of different exchange rates. Therefore, 
exploring agents’ behaviour and explicitly the way they form their expectations is of outermost 
importance to the monetary policy authorities.  
 
Therefore, Kohlhagen (1979) and Levich (1985) argue that one cannot neglect the activities of 
central banks in foreign exchange markets in conventional tests of efficiency since these activities 
may have a very strong and decisive effect leading to the movements of exchange rate as well as 
on the efficiency of the market relative to the activities of arbitrageurs and speculator.1 
 
Accordingly, it has become increasingly necessary to have a flexible monetary implementation framework 
which, by acting on sufficiently efficient money markets, gently guides interest rate movements, 
transmitting rapidly and clearly the messages imparted by the authorities and thus contributing to a better 
transmission of monetary policy (Sanz and Val, 1993). 
 
In February 2000 the Governor of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), announced that 
South Africa was to formally introduce Inflation Targeting (IT) as the new monetary policy 
framework. Under this new policy regime, monetary policy aims at pre-announced inflation 
targets, with the interest rate as the instrument variable for achieving them. This has essentially 
stabilized interest rates by making them more predictable. Moreover, the implementation of the 
policy has required the authorities to abandon pre-commitment to any exchange rate parity, 
particularly using exchange rate interventions; it has effectively made the exchange rate regime a 
free float. Since the inflation-targeting regime stabilizes interest rates, such a reduction in 
volatility of a key nominal variable should improve information processing by the market. To 
that extent, therefore, the regime switch to inflation targeting should anchor the market’s 
expectations to pricing of the exchange rate based on economic fundamentals (Mtonga, 2011). 
 
                                                          
1 See Sarno, L. and Taylor, M.P. (2002). “The Economics of Exchange Rates”. First edition. Cambridge University 
Press. 
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Two particular reasons stand out as to why the monetary authorities made the decision to switch 
to a framework of formal inflation targeting, first the system of informal inflation targeting at 
times created uncertainties among the public about the monetary policy stance adopted by the 
authorities; and secondly the application of inflation targeting affects inflationary expectations, 
which should facilitate a reduction in inflation. If inflation targets are perceived to be credible, 
they form the basis for future price and wage setting. Inflation targets, in theory, should 
therefore influence the increase in the operational cost of enterprises as well as their price setting 
(van der Merwe, 2004)2 
 
One of the key elements of inflation targeting involves the increased transparency of the 
monetary policy strategy through communication with the public and the markets about the 
plans and objectives of the monetary policy committee (Mishkin, 2001). Furthermore, adherence 
to a nominal anchor such as inflation and interest rates which keeps the nominal variable within 
a narrow range promotes price stability by directly promoting low and stable inflation 
expectations.3 
 
Upon the adherence of the inflation targeting framework the SARB has put considerable stress 
on the need to make monetary policy transparent and to maintain regular channels of 
communications with the public through publications such as the SARB monthly release of 
selected data 4 , the Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) 
Meetings or statements where the governor of the SARB gives the general public a review of the 
state of monetary economy, current and future path of inflation rates, exchange rates, interest 
rates amongst other variables.  
 
The ability of central banks to convey their medium-term intentions regarding money market 
conditions, as well as their longer-term objectives in a convincing and credible manner to market 
participants is of outmost importance to the success of their objectives as this allows market 
participants to rationally and consistently form their expectation about future values on key 
variables such as inflation, interest and exchange rates; this further contributes to easing the 
uncertainty part of the decision making process.   This signalling capacity of the central bank can 
                                                          
2 For further discussion, see Van der Merwe E. J., (2004) “Inflation targeting in South Africa” South African Reserve Bank 
Occasional Paper no 19. 
3 Evidence that adoption of inflation targeting leads to an immediate fall in inflation expectations is however not strong. For 
example, Bernanke et al. (1999) and Levin, Natalucci and Piger (2004) do not find that inflation targeting leads to an immediate 
fall in expected inflation, but Johnson (2002, 2003) does find some evidence that expected inflation falls after announcement of 
inflation targets. See F.S. Mishkin (2006) 
4 The release is divided into sections covering: Money and banking; Banks and mutual banks; International economic data; 
Capital market; National government finance; and Economic indicators. 
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be of considerable importance to the behaviour of increasingly integrated financial markets, 
which at times display unexpected volatility and even turbulence. One market which is especially 
sensitive to the signalling capacity of the central bank is the foreign exchange market, which is 
our focus in this paper. Changes in monetary operating procedures in some cases have been 
made with the specific intent of improving this signalling capacity. 
 
Inflation targeting is thus expected to anchor market expectations to pricing the currency based 
on economic fundamentals, since it stabilises interest rates by make them more predictable; it is 
also supposed to eliminate the uncertainty element in the decision making process, by reducing 
the risk premium required by the market participants. Furthermore, inflation targeting should 
allow and induce the market to form more consistent, homogenous and rational expectations 
about the future level of key economic variables such as interest rates, inflation and exchange 
rates (Mtonga, 2011). A number of authors have linked foreign exchange market efficiency to the 
existence of a long-run relationship between the future spot and forward rates. For example, 
Razzak (1999) tested the UFRH for New Zealand, Canada, UK and Sweden as the inflation 
targeting countries and Germany and Japan as the non-inflation targeting countries. The author 
rejected the UFRH in almost all countries except for New Zealand and the UK during the 
inflation targeting period. The author concludes that that inflation targeting improves the 
efficiency of the foreign exchange market. Thus, the purpose of this study is to investigate 
whether the adoption of inflation targeting, as the new anchor of monetary policy by the SARB, 
has had an impact in the South African foreign exchange market efficiency by testing the 
Unbiased Forward Rate Hypothesis. The study applies the autoregressive dynamic lag (ARDL) 
cointegration technique to the South African foreign exchange market by testing the long-run 
relationship between the future spot and forward rates of the rand dollar exchange rate in two 
distinct periods, namely the period before inflation targeting and the period after inflation 
targeting.  
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows, section 2 presents the methodology of the paper; 
section 3 includes a description of the data and the empirical results of the paper; and section 4 
concludes the paper. 
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II. METHODOLOGY 
 
The statistical test of the UFRH relies of the relationship between the future spot rate and the 
forward rate. The econometrics relationship that defines the hypothesis is often expressed as: 
 
ttkt fS                                                                       (1) 
 
Where ktS   refers to the future spot rate and tf represents the forward rate. The UFRH holds 
under the condition that 0 and 1 .  
 
Equation 1 can be reformulated by subtracting tS from each side of the equation. In which case 
the following expression is obtained: 
 
ttttkt SfSS   )(      (2) 
 
One of the advantage of using Equation 2 is that variables may become integrated of order one 
and its estimation by the ordinary least square (OLS) method can then be consistent and robust, 
thus, avoiding the possibility of spurious regression. Nonetheless, it may be possible that 
Equation 2 includes variables with different level of integration. In such conditions, the ARDL 
cointegration, as proposed by Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) will be robust and efficient to estimate 
Equation 2 in the context of the UFRH.  
 
It is important to note that while the above-discussed restriction are important for testing the 
UFRH, a number of authors contend that the UFRH is a long-run relationship obscured by 
short-term deviation. As such, econometric methods that assess the long-run relationship 
between variables are proper to test the UFRH (Moosa and Bhatti, 1995). Thus, this paper 
employs the ARDL cointegration technique to test the long-run the relationship between future 
spot and forward rates in the South African foreign exchange market to infer whether the 
foreign exchange market has become efficient with the inflation targeting regime.  
 
The main advantage of the ARDL approach to cointegration is that it can be applied when the 
variables are of different order of integration (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997). The authors show 
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that for a vector  ttt XYZ , , there exists at most one long-run level relationship between tY
and tX , irrespective of the level of integration.  
 
Assume the ARDL (p,q), whereby p represents the autoregressive order and q is the number of 
lags. If tX  represents the forcing variable tY can be written as: 
tY =   11 txyytyy XYbta   



1
1
p
i
itZi  + ttX       (3)  
With 1,...,1  pi . 
  
It follows from the relation (3) that if πyy   0 and πxyy  0, a non-degenerate long-run 
relationship exists between tY and tX  that is defined by: 
 
ttxtt XY  10  with t= 1, 2,…n       (4)        
Where 
yyyy
ba




 10 ; and 
yy
xyy
x


        ηt is a zero mean stationary process.  Equation 
(4) assumes the presence of the deterministic trend.                                                       
In order to test for the absence of a long-run level relationship between tY and tX  Pesaran 
et al. (2001) adopted a method that consists of the examining of the joint hypothesis 0yyπ  and 
0xyyπ  in the error correction model given in equation (3). A non-standard F-critical is used to 
test for the above joint hypothesis, irrespective of whether the explanatory variables are 
stationary or non-stationary.  
 
 
III. DATA, METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
 
a. Data 
 
The data set contains weekly data for the spot rand/dollar (R/$) exchange rate as a dependent 
variable as well as 1-month, 3-month, 6-month and 9-month forward exchange rates as the 
different explanatory variables where all variables are expressed in logarithms. All data was 
obtained from I-net Bridge.  Our data set is evenly divided into two data sets distinguishing the 
period before (from 4/23/1993 to 02/07/2000) and after (from 02/14/2000 to 11/27/2006) the 
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implementation of the inflation targeting framework.5 The ARDL approach to cointegration is 
applied to test the long-run relationship implies by Equation 2. As from this equation, 6,3,1k
and 9 for the equivalent of 1-month, 3-month, 6-month and 9-month forward exchange rates. 
For example, the constructed variable tktkt SSdspot   represents the k-month change in 
exchange rate. However, ttkt Sfdforw  represents the k -month forward premium/discount, 
where tf is a 1-month forward rate.  
 
As per Equation 2, the following equations will be estimated using the ARDL approach to 
cointegration: 
 
ttt dforwdspot   1111        (5) 
ttt dforwdspot   3333        (6) 
ttt dforwdspot   66661        (7) 
ttt dforwdspot   9999        (8) 
 
b. Empirical Results  
 
b1.  Augmented Dickey Fuller and Phillips-Perron Unit root test  
 
Table 1 and Table2 present the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillip-Perron tests of stationarity 
for the level and first difference variables respectively. The results of the stationarity test show 
that the null hypothesis of no stationarity at level is not rejected for all the change of exchange 
rate series. Nonetheless, the hypothesis is not rejected for the forward premium/discount series. 
This indicates that are dealing with series of different level of integration. As such the ARDL 
cointegration is justified to assess the long-run relationship between variables represented in 
Equations 5 to 8. 
 
The next step of our empirical analysis consists of assessing the long-run relationship between 
future spot and forward rates of different maturities as per Equations 5 to 8.  
 
                                                          
5 Each data set contains a total of 355 observations. The years beyond 2006 were not included in our research 
on purpose to avoid the spillover effects of the Global financial crises that occurred in those years. 
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Table 1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips Perron tests for stationarity on the level 
 
 
Series  
  
Period before inflation targeting  Period after inflation targeting  
ADF PP ADF PP 
Adj. t-Stat (p-value) Adj. t-Stat (p-value) Adj. t-Stat (p-value) Adj. t-Stat (p-value) 
dspot1 -16.8151 (0.0000) -16.9294 (0.0000) -17.3003 (0.0000) -17.3002 (0.0000) 
dspot3 -5.2589 (0.0000) -5.6754 (0.0000) -5.3473 (0.0001) -6.7154 (0.0000) 
dspot6 -4.8687 (0.0000) -5.4531 (0.0000) -3.2220 (0.0013) -5.8087 (0.0000) 
dspot9 -4.5408 (0.0015) -4.7466 (0.0000) -2.8794 (0.0040) -4.5434 (0.0000) 
dforw1 -1.1699 (0.9141) -1.7010 (0.7491) -1.2929 (0.8879) -1.3003 (0.8861) 
dforw3 -1.3304 (0.8786) -1.2062 (0.9070) -1.2589 (0.8958) -1.2711 (0.8930) 
dforw6 -1.7187 (0.7411) -1.3837 (0.8643) -1.3167 (0.8820) -1.3589 (0.8711) 
dforw9 -1.6507 (0.7707) -1.4219 (0.8531) -1.5328 (0.8166) -1.4130 (0.8558) 
 
 
Table 2. Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillip-Perron tests for stationarity on first difference 
 
 
Series  
  
Period before inflation targeting  Period after inflation targeting  
ADF PP ADF PP 
Adj. t-Stat (p-value) Adj. t-Stat (p-value) Adj. t-Stat (p-value) Adj. t-Stat (p-value) 
dforw1 -10.7144 (0.0000) -28.1303 (0.0000) -25.4796 (0.0000) -26.0728 (0.0000) 
dforw3 -8.2643 (0.0000) -20.5208 (0.0000) -19.9374 (0.0000) -19.9153 (0.0000) 
dforw6 -7.9919 (0.0000) -20.7030 (0.0000) -16.7824 (0.0000) -16.9277 (0.0000) 
dforw9 -8.1080 (0.0000) -19.8899 (0.0000) 6.6437 (0.0000) -20.0368 (0.0000) 
 
 
b2. ARDL cointegration: test of long-run relationship 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the Bound test for ARDL cointegration to test the long-run 
relationship implied by Equation 2. For example, the calculated F-statistics of  11 / dforwdspotF  
provide the null hypothesis of whether there is long-run relationship (cointegration) between 
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dspot1 and dforw1 when the relationship is normalised for dspot1.  The same applied for all other 
different maturities. The bounded F-critical for the test is proposed by Pesaran and Pesaran 
(1997). The F-critical applied in this paper refers to the case of intercept and no trend, which 
values are 3.793 and 4.855 for lower and upper bounds, respectively. The results reported in 
Table 3 indicates that the null hypothesis of ‘no long-run relationship’ or ‘no cointegration’ 
between the future spot and forward rates of different maturities (1,3,6 and 9) is rejected in the 
period after inflation targeting. This indicates that there is equilibrium between the forward rate 
and the future spot rate. The finding indicates an equilibrium between the two rates and thus, the 
proof of efficiency of the forward exchange market for all the maturities. Nonetheless, during 
the period before inflation targeting, there is no evidence of a long-run relationship between the 
future spot and forward rates for 6-month maturity. Although efficiency or equilibrium 
relationship is found between the spot and forward rates for the 1-, 3- and 9-month maturities.  
 
Table 3. The ARDL cointegration test for long-run relationship  
  
  
Period before inflation targeting  Period after inflation targeting  
F- statistics outcome F-statistics Outcome 
F(dspot1/dforw1) 64.96* Cointegration 73.86* Cointegration 
F(dspot3/dforw3) 12.96* Cointegration 42.64* Cointegration 
F(dspot6/dforw6) 3.66 No cointegration 11.14* Cointegration 
F(dspot9/dforw9) 7.63* cointegration 4.89* Cointegration 
* denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship (cointegration) given the 
bound F-critical (3.793 – 4.855). 
 
These results indicate that the efficiency of the foreign exchange, proxied by the long-run 
relationship between the future spot and the forward rates, has improved during the period after 
inflation targeting in South Africa. This finding is in line with the conclusion of a number of 
studies that show that inflation targeting monetary regime has improved expectations of 
economic agents in South Africa. For example, Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) provided detail 
evidence of significant improvement in central bank transparency in South Africa in the period 
after the adoption of inflation targeting. The authors show that the anticipation of important 
financial and economic variables has improved considerably during the same period. This reality 
has definitely contributed to our finding that the future spot rate traces the movement of the 
forward rate in the foreign exchange rate, indicating an improvement of expectation by 
economic agents in South Africa.   It is important to note that the evidence of efficient forward 
9 
 
exchange market during the inflation targeting monetary regime should imply that the regime 
precludes all possibilities of arbitrage opportunities in the forward exchange market.   
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper examined the question whether the implementation of the inflation targeting 
framework by the South African reserve bank has in any way contributed to the achievement of 
foreign exchange market efficiency. The study applied the ARDL cointegration technique to test 
the long-run relationship between the future spot and forward rates in the periods before after 
the implementation of inflation targeting monetary policy in South Africa. The results of the 
empirical analysis show that the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship between the two 
variables is rejected for all forward rate maturities during the period after the implementation of 
inflation targeting monetary policy but could not be rejected in the period before the 
implementation of inflation targeting. These results together with the findings of other authors 
such as Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) confirm that inflation targeting policy has improved 
expectation, especially in the foreign exchange market in South Africa. 
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